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Abstract 
Rio Tinto Iron Ore owns and operates the largest privately owned rail system in Australia, 
with approximately 1700km of mainline, servicing 15 different mine sites. To haul the iron 
ore from the mines the railway utilises 191 locomotives and approximately 11500 wagons. 
The ore is loaded into the wagons whereby it is transported via rail to one of 3 ports for 
export. 
The unloading of the wagons at the port is done via a rotary car dumper, whereby the wagon 
enters the process inside of the dumper and the wagon is turned 100° axially to dump the 
ore into a chute. Once dumped the wagon is returned to original orientation and evacuated 
via an indexing arm and the process repeated.  
Rio Tinto Iron Ore have experienced regular derailments on the outgoing side of the car 
dumpers at their Parker Point operations, known as CD3P/CD4P, in the Pilbara since their 
installation in 2007. The outgoing track section has seen an increased number of 
derailments in the final quarter of 2015 and again in the first quarter of 2016, adding 
pressures to find a route cause and solution. As a mitigation measure in 2012 a non-active 
checkrail was installed in an attempt to return the low leg wheel set to alignment once 
flange climb had occurred. This has proved to be ineffective with the checkrail at CD3P 
and CD4P currently installed such that it does not fulfil its intended function. In the current 
alignment and orientation, the checkrail does not contact the wheel until the opposing 
wheel has derailed and moved over centre of the high leg rail.  
This work investigates existing site conditions at the location and assesses them in line with 
the generally accepted standards and identifies a root cause.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
AAR   Association of American Railroads 
ONRSR  Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator 
IOC  Instrumented Ore Car 
µ    coefficient of friction 
α    Yaw angle 
Vt    Lateral velocity of a wheelset 
ω    Angular velocity 
r    rolling radius 
q   Wheelset angle of attack 
β    Wheel flange angle 
L    lateral force at wheel flange  
V    Vertical load on the wheel 
N    Force normal to flange angle 
PoD  Point of Derailment 
CD3/CD4  Car Dumper #3/Car Dumper #4 
PP3/4ECL  Parker Point CD3/CD4 empty car line 
PPCD3LCL Parker Point Car Dumper 3 Loaded Car Line 
PPCD4LCL Parker Point Car Dumper 4 Loaded Car Line
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION  
Rio Tinto has installed checkrails at the location CD3P and CD4P as a measure to stop 
derailments due to flange climb on the tight radius curve on the outgoing side of the car 
dumpers. The checkrails were installed in 2012 following 4 derailment events within the 
first 6 months of the year. Following the installation, it appeared that the mitigation 
measure had been effective with only 1 derailment occurring in the following 12 months. 
Since this time the number of derailments at this location has continued to rise and has in 
2016 surpassed the numbers that had been experienced in 2012, with 6 events occurring in 
the first 6 months of the year. 
1.1 Project Objectives  
The aim of this report is to identify the contributing factors and root causes of repeated 
derailments that have occurred at Rio Tinto’s Car Dumper 3P and Car Dumper 4P at Parker 
Point, Dampier Western Australia. The report considers the existing site conditions and 
identifies the potential rectification measures.  
 
The report focuses on the design and function of the existing checkrail, due to generally 
held belief that the checkrail installed is ineffective and is failing to perform its intended 
function. The intent is to determine if modification of the existing checkrail is warranted 
and if so, identify the parameters requiring change and develop a fit for purpose checkrail 
to mitigate the derailment risk. This report also identifies probable contributing factors to 
the derailments and outlines the containment options available to rectify these. 
The scope of the project is: 
• To investigate the underlying causes and site specific conditions 
contributing to the regular derailments at CD3 and CD4. 
• Develop a rectification methodology, including the development of a 
replacement fit for purpose checkrail if deemed the appropriate control. 
• Identify and deliver maintenance recommendations for the new checkrail 
and track section. 
1.2 Background  
Rio Tinto Iron Ore Pilbara operations maintain 3 ports as part of their export operation. In 
order to transport the iron ore from inland mine sites to the port, in preparation for export, 
the ore is loaded onto trains at the mine and transferred to the ship loading facilities via the 
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rail network. 
 
Once at the port the ore is offloaded via a rotary car dumper, whereby the rail wagon is 
held to the section of isolated track and rotated so that the contents of the wagon are 
emptied. Once emptied the unloaded wagons, whilst still attached to the remaining consist, 
are evacuated from the car dumper section via an indexing arm that forces the wagon 
through the outgoing (empty) side of the process. Once all wagons are unloaded the consist 
will be returned to the main running line under the power of locomotive by travelling back 
through the Parker Point CD3/CD4 empty car line. 
 
The outgoing track sections at Parker Point -1.18km PPCD3LCL and -1.18km PPCD4LCL 
have a history of derailing empty ore wagons since the dumpers were commissioned in 
2007.  
The below, figure 1 shows the the total count by year of known derailments on the outgo 
side of CD3P and CD4P, of which most have identical symptoms.  
 
 
Figure 1: CD3P/CD4P Derailment History 
1.3 Financial Costs of Derailment 
The delay accounting records from the Parker Point dumpers reveal that there has been an 
average of 15 trains or 450,000 tonnes lost per year as a result of derailment delays from 
2008-2016. This time delay and cost is not inclusive that associated with derailment clean 
up or repairing track damage. There have been multiple occurrences at the location 
whereby the section has been closed for more than 2 days whilst investigation and clean-
up is undertaken. Not including these major events, the average delay due to minor 
derailment is 4.5hours.  
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Presuming that the iron ore price has been at the current spot price of $55/tonne and the 
losses only include the 450,000 tonnes, the annual cost to the business is in the order of 
$24M. 
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Derailment 
Derailment on any railway is a significant event. In Western Australia all derailments are 
reportable to the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator in line with s.57 of Rail Safety 
National Law (WA) Regulations 2015.  
 
Derailments are classified by the regulator as; “Where one or more rolling stock wheels 
leave the rail or track during railway operations.” 
 
 
Figure 2: CD3P Derailment Feb 2016 
According to the RISSB Derailment Investigation and Analysis Guideline there are many 
causes of derailment. The typically accepted immediate causes are listed below: 
• Wheel obstruction,  
• Wheel(s) lifted off the rail,  
• Rail gauge widening, Wheel(s) drop between rails  
• Wheels rotate over rail (vehicle overturning),  
• Flange or wheel climb. 
The above derailment mechanisms can be summarised as: 
• Wheels lifted off the rails – large forces or shocks in the train (sudden 
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applications of power or take up of slack in the train draft gear), braking 
shocks, collision, wagons squeezed up, axle journal shears off, obstruction to 
bogie, or collapse of a safety critical part of the vehicle.  
• Rail gauge widening – this requires failure of the rail or the rail 
fastening/support, or the wheel moving on the axle.  
• Wheel obstruction – a physical obstruction of the wheels or bogie by 
relatively small objects e.g. ballast or dislodged rolling stock components. 
Wheels are deflected from the rails or the flangeway is lifted.  
• Wheels rotate over the rail – this is associated with overturning of the 
vehicle (rollover). The most common cause being excessive speed on a 
tight curve.  
• Flange climb – a change in the train forces and conditions at the wheel 
flange/rail contact point that leads to the flange climbing and crossing the 
rail. Typically, from a large reduction in wheel load (V), high lateral force 
(L) from single factor or combination of factors involving vehicle, track 
geometry, train handling.  
 
Additional mechanisms for derailment can occur at the locations of points and switches on 
a network, however this is not relevant to this location and is not further considered. 
2.2 Wheel – Rail-Wheel Interface theory 
The interface between rail and wheel on the railway is an extremely complex system. 
During normal operation the interface between the wheel and the rail is a small horizontal 
contact patch of approximately 1cm2 and is subjected to very high stresses. This location 
continuously varies with the movement of the train as it progresses down the track. The 
possible regions for Wheel rail contact and the typical corresponding conditions are taken 
from Tournay, 2001 and shown in figure 4, with figure 3 showing the typical contact 
stresses for the wheelset when entering a Right hand curve. 
 
The understanding of wheel-rail interface has typically been demarcated between civil 
engineers, dealing with the rail and foundations, and mechanical engineers dealing with the 
wheel and vehicle. Whilst the basic principal of wheel – rail system is that of a flanged 
wheelset rolling along a rigid steel track the irreversibility of the process dictates that a 
systems based approach is best served to solving the problems involving rail wheel 
interface. Full understanding of wheel–rail contact is extremely complex and is beyond the 
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scope and requirements of this project. 
 
 
Figure 3 Contact stress for wheelset entering RH curve 
 
 
Figure 4 Wheel - Rail contact zones (Adapted from Tournay, 2001) 
Region A – Wheel tread contacts rail head; The wheel – rail contact is made most often 
in this region and usually occurs when the vehicle is running on straight track or very high 
radius curves. This region yields the lowest contact stresses and lateral forces. 
Region B – Wheel flange contacts rail gauge corner; The contact in this region is much 
smaller than in region A and is often more sever. Typically wear rates and contact stresses 
are much higher. 
Region C – Contact between field sides of wheel and rail; Contact is least likely to occur 
here. If contact does occur, high contact stresses are induced and undesirable wear features 
occur. This leads to incorrect steering of the wheelset. 
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2.3 Wheelset 
For simplicity, a wheelset can be described as two conical, nearly cylindrical wheels, linked 
together with a rigid axle. To prevent derailment by simply running off the track, each 
wheel has a flange located on the track center line side of the wheel. In straight line running 
the flanges do not contact the rail head, however will go to rail flange contact with the rail 
gauge corner in curves.  
 
The rigid link between the two wheels would indicate that the railway wheelset is designed 
only to go straight ahead but in order to have the wheelset negotiate curves the tread profile 
of the wheelset is designed with a slight taper from the flange to the outside of the wheel. 
This means that the largest wheel tread diameter is closest to the flange and in cornering 
the wheelset will have the flange of one wheel forced into contact with the rail and the other 
wheel on the axle will then run on the outer section of the tread. The net effect being that 
the wheelset will be running on wheels of different diameters and therefore assist curve 
negotiation.  
 
Rio Tinto wheels run a 3.4mm taper with 900mm radius over 43.5mm and a ±0.25mm 
tolerance. The full profile can be seen in Appendix B. 
2.4 Wheelset degrees of freedom 
Assuming in this instance that the track is rigid, the wheelset has only the degrees of 
freedom as illustrated in figure 5: 
Where;  
• Lateral displacement (y) and,  
• Angle of attack, (q) or as shown in figure 5 (a) 
 
Figure 5: Wheelset degrees of freedom (Ayasse & Chollet 2006)  
The Wheelset Angle-of-Attack (AOA) is defined as the angle (q) between the axis of 
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rotation of the wheelset and a radial line in a curve or a line perpendicular to the track 
centreline on tangent track.  
The lateral displacement and the angle of attack are considered as two small displacements 
relative to the track and taken at the centerline. The amount of displacement, known as 
‘play’ will be the limit, of the lateral displacement between the two flange contacts. For 
Rio Tinto wheelsets, this is generally in the order of 8 mm, dependent on the flange wear.  
2.5 Theory of Flange Climb and L/V 
The most commonly accepted theory for L/V ratio is Nadal’s as described in section 2.9. 
In addition to the equation by Nadal there have been a number of studies that support the 
notion, including work by Wu and Wilson 2006, that flange climb derailments generally 
occur on curves. This is due to the wheels on the outer rail, known as the high rail, 
experiencing a base level of lateral force to vertical force ratio (L/V) related to:  
• Curve radius,  
• Wheel profile,  
• Bogie suspension characteristics,  
• Vehicle speed.    
These factors combine to generate a base wheelset angle of attack (AoA), which in turn 
generates the base level of lateral curving force. When the L/V ratio exceeds the capabilities 
of the wheel, flange climb occurs.  
 
Factors contributing to high L/V ratios are listed below: 
• Track misalignments including twist over the bogie and variations in super 
elevation 
• Torsionally stiff vehicles operating on track with excessive twist 
• Excessive super elevation 
• Lateral or longitudinal vehicle loading imbalances 
• Sever flat spot on wheel 
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2.6 L/V Ratio 
The lateral to vertical force ratio (L/V) is the lateral force pushing outward against the rail 
divided by the vertical force pushing downward on the top of the rail. The L/V ratio gives 
an indication of the likelihood of derailment due to flange climb and also rail lateral 
displacement and rollover. The tendency for derailment increases as the L/V ratio 
increases. This concept is important for understanding these derailment mechanisms.  
 
The L/V ratio will increase if the lateral force increases and the vertical force remains 
constant, or if the vertical force decreases and the lateral force remains constant. High 
lateral forces are usually accompanied by high vertical loads, which keep L/V ratios below 
critical level. The highest L/V ratios most often occur because of a sudden reduction in 
vertical load. 
 
 
Figure 6:Wheelset angle of attack (AoA) 
2.7 Wheel creep 
When a wheel is rotating there are a number of forces generated that influence the wheel 
motion. A centrifugal force acts on a rail vehicle as it negotiates a curve. The 
superelevation of the high rail causes gravity to provide part of the force to react to the 
centrifugal force. The uncompensated centrifugal force on a vehicle as it negotiates a 
curve has to be balanced by the wheel-rail forces. The high rail bears larger lateral forces 
than the low rail because of the action of the unbalanced centrifugal force and lateral 
creep forces caused by axle angle of attack. The creep force alone, due to angle of attack 
is rarely sufficient to cause the wheel to derail, however need to be understood as it can 
be sufficient to stop the wheel from falling back and stopping derailment. 
 Lateral creep is influenced by the angle of attack through a component of the wheelset’s 
rotational velocity. If there is lateral velocity in addition to the velocity set up by the 
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wheels’ rotational velocity the net lateral velocity is given by:  
Vy =y–ωrq   (1) 
The rotational velocity is given by: 
      Vt = -ωrsin (q)    (2) 

Lateral creep can be defined as the wheel–rail relative lateral velocity divided by the 
forward velocity.  "# = % − #' ()*+        (3) 
where % − #' is the effective angle of attack as a function of the wheelsets lateral 
velocity, Vy. The term sec(δ) always has a positive value during flange climb and the 
direction of the lateral creep is dependent on the sign of the term % − #' 	. From equation 
(3) it can be seen that the lateral creep equals zero when q equals #'.  
The lateral creep changes direction when q<#'̇.  
Figure 7. by Wu and Wilson shows the three phases or the flange climb process. 
 
Phase 1, left hand illustration, the wheel is under a lateral force and the wheel moves right 
initiating flange contact with the rail. A lateral creep force is produced and acts on the 
wheel to oppose flange climb. 
Phase 2, the flange contact angle is increased and the wheelset lateral velocity decreases. 
This results in the lateral creep and creep force reversing direction due to the change of 
sign of the effective angle of attack in which the lateral force is assisting the wheel to climb.  
Phase 3 occurs once the maximum contact angle has passed, the wheelset lateral velocity 
increases resulting in rapid lateral displacement of the wheelset. This results in the effective 
angle of attack approaching zero and changes sign. This leads to the lateral creep and creep 
force changing direction and the lateral creep forces now oppose the wheel climbing 
motion.  
 
Figure 7: Flange climb process (Wu & Wilson 2006) 
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2.8 Flange Climb Distance Criterion 
In practice, a flange climbing derailment is not instant. The L/V ratio has to be 
maintained while the climbing takes place. If the lateral force returns to zero before the 
flange has reached the top of the rail, the wheel might be expected to drop down again. 
When the flange contacts the rail for a short duration, as may be the case during hunting 
(kinematic oscillations) of the wheelset, the L/V ratio might exceed Nadal’s limit without 
flange climbing. For that reason, the flange-climb-distance criteria were developed to 
evaluate the risk of derailment associated with the wheel L/V ratio limit. Flange climb 
derailment would occur only if both wheel L/V ratio limit and distance limit are 
exceeded.  
In general, a larger angle of attack reduces the distance required for flange climb derailment 
as shown in Figure 8: Relationship between climb distance and angle of attack. Hence by 
bringing the check rail closer, the climb distance increases. This means that high lateral 
forces have to act on the bogie for a longer period of time to cause a derailment.  
 
Figure 8: Relationship between climb distance and angle of attack 
2.9 Nadal Equation 
In 1896 M. J. Nadal proposed the railway design equation relating downward force of the 
wheel upon the rail, to the lateral force of the wheel flange against the face of the rail. This 
equation is universally used to determine the maximum ratio of lateral force to vertical 
force before derailment may occur. 
The equation is given by:  
 ./ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) 
 
Where L is the lateral force, V is the vertical force, θ is the wheel rail contact angle between 
the line of action and the horizontal and µ is the dynamic coefficient of friction. When the 
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Nadal Limit is exceeded for a period of time derailment can occur. Hence the Nadal limit 
gives the ratio of the maximum lateral force to vertical force that can occur before there is 
a risk of derailment. It is generally accepted that the lateral force should not exceed 50% 
of the Vertical force to reduce the likelihood of derailment. It is clear from this criterion 
that wheels with low flange angles and high coefficients of friction are at a higher risk of 
derailment. 
Nadal’s theory is generally accepted as the defining value for instances where the AoA (q) 
is greater than 5mrad or the AoA is at an unknown value, as is generally the case for live 
track. For values less than 5mrad that can be measured can be treated less conservatively  
 
Figure 9 Flange climb components (RISSB 2013) 
 
 
Figure 10: Contact angle for a new wagon wheel 
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2.10 Nytran Plot 
The multiple angles on railcar wheels make them difficult to position on the track 
mathematically. Instead graphical techniques such as Nytram diagrams and track diagrams 
can be used to assess the positioning of the wagon. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Illustration of Nytram diagram 
Nytram diagrams are constructed by taking 3 slices through the wheel. One is done at the 
gauge face of the rail (15.9mm down from the rail head by North American standard), 
another at the top of the rail and the third at the top of the check rail. These profiles are 
then mapped on onto a two-dimensional drawing of the wheel. From this drawing, wheels 
can then be spaced as if they were on a bogie and placed onto track. 
 
Figure 12: Example of wheel set placed on track 
 
The bogie can then be moved around on the track to replicate the situation when it is 
cornering.  
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2.11 Track Misalignment 
A derailment due to track twist in a curve can happen because the misalignment causes the 
vertical downward forces on the front wheels on one side of the wagon and the opposite 
side rear wheels to reduce. Track twist is the difference in cross level between two points 
on the track. The report states a flange climb derailment can occur in a curve if the track is 
twisted which is consistent with Wu and Wilson 2006. 
2.12 Torsionally Stiff Vehicles 
Tyrell, Weinstock and Greif in a report for the US Department of Transportation state that 
track twist can lead to derailment for stiffly sprung vehicles. Light vehicles with stiff 
springs, creating a torsionally stiff vehicle, are generally more susceptible to wheel 
unloading. Rio Tinto places strict parameters around twist at 2m (short twist) and at 8m 
(long twist) for mainline track. These can be seen in the Appendix.  
2.13 Superelevation 
Superelevation is where a track is banked into a curve to assist in vehicle corning.  An 
example on super-elevation can be seen in Figure 13. 
Excessive superelevation on slow speed curves decreases the force on the wheels running 
on the high rail due to the change in the centre of gravity (COG) toward the inner rail (low 
leg). This increase in L/V ratio increases the likelihood of wheel climb.  
To steer through a curve there must be lateral forces on the flanges and if the unloading of 
the vertical forces is greater than what is necessary to overcome the lateral forces the flange 
will climb the rail.  
It is possible to alter track Track super-elevation to reduce derailment likelihood.  
 
Figure 13 (Left) Level track, (Right) - Track with Super-elevation 
 
Increasing the track superelevation of the curved track following the dumpers would reduce 
the force which the outer wheel flange bears against the outer rail, and therefore would also 
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reduce its tendency to climb the rail. A gradual reduction in the height of the low rail 
relative to the high rail would provide super elevation which may be beneficial to reduce 
the risk of derailments at this location. Alteration of track superelevation alone will not 
stop derailment in this area. The continued existence of a relatively abrupt dip will lead to 
uplift of the following wagon as the average height of the previous wagon is lower down, 
and therefore this combination will generate vertical as well as horizontal forces.  
The presence of vertical dips continues to elevate the risk of vertical unloading, as the 
compressive forces now have a vertical component due to the change in angle from one 
wagon to another at the dip.  
Other measures have been suggested as options to reduce the risk of derailment at the 
dumpers, including placement of a liner on the check rail to close the gap between the back 
face of the wheel, or a reduction in the incidence of sticky brakes. However, both of these 
have issues as containment measures. The closure of the gap at the check rail may work in 
the short term measure, but this is an unproven approach, and may introduce new issues 
that are not anticipated, not least being that any vertical dips may be allowed to progress to 
comparable or worse levels rather than being resolved.  
2.14 Checkrail  
To reduce the likelihood of flange climb derailment, check rails, also known as restraining 
rails, are used in railway systems. 
A checkrail or restraining rail is primarily installed to reduce the likelihood of flange climb 
derailment on the high leg of a curve and secondarily installed for the purpose of providing 
additional steering action by using the flange of the wheel that is on the inside of the curve. 
In addition to increasing the track’s resistance to flange climb derailment they are also to 
reduce rail wear in sharp curves, where the high rail wears rapidly. The use of active 
checkrails is considered beneficial in reducing the frequency of rail replacement and 
therefore reduces the maintenance frequency and cost of high-rail replacements. The 
Checkrail assists in guiding any vehicle around the curve by constraining the face of the 
leading inner wheel against it at the same time as the outer wheel flange bears against the 
outer rail. 
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Figure 14 Wheel and horizontal restraining rail geometry 
 
The use of a checkrail will reduce the tendency for the outside wheel to derail by climbing 
the high rail. The use of a checkrail will reduce the lateral force of the opposite outside 
wheel flange. The extent of this reduction will be dependent on the type of checkrail 
utilised. The three types of checkrail are summarised below. 
1. Active restraining rail: Defined as the restraining rail that reduces the angle of attack 
(AOA) by more than 50%. 
2. Semi-active restraining rail: Defined as the restraining rail that reduces the AOA by 
50% or less, preferably between 40% 	 50%. 
3. Passive restraining rail: Defined as the restraining rail that does not reduce the AOA. 
In other words, it plays a passive role in steering the wheel. 
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2.15 Track lubrication 
2.15.1 Friction/Adhesion Control  
Friction levels at the rail-wheel interface have a significant impact on the performance of 
wheel and rail components, not only in terms of wear and the development of rolling 
contact fatigue (RCF) damage, but also through the influence on the dynamic behaviour of 
the vehicle (i.e. steering), noise and propensity for flange climb.  
The major benefits of applying lubrication are; 
• Reduced wheel/rail wear 
• Reduces noise 
• Reduced wheel climb derailment 
 The reduction in wheel climb derailment impact can be seen directly in the Nadal equation. 
There are numerous suppliers of friction modification/lubrication equipment, however the 
three main options include:  
a)  Grease Lubrication: A typical grease lubrication system consists of an applicator bar 
fitted to the gauge corner of the rail, a pump & reservoir and an activation device (electronic 
or mechanical). Grease is applied to the gauge corner region of the rail, thus lubricating a 
targeted area normally exposed to high creepage which subsequently reduces the risk of 
flange climb. An alternative to wayside installation is through regular manual application 
of grease onto the gauge corner of the rail. This can either be through hand operation or via 
specially designed hi-rail equipment, and while possibly the cheapest option, the 
performance is often limited.  
b)  Top of Rail Friction Modifier: Friction modifiers may also be applied to regulate the 
friction level to within a 0.3-0.35 adhesion limit. Product is applied to the rail via applicator 
bars, in a similar manner to the grease but targeting the top of the rail as opposed to the 
gauge corner only. The product is usually water based, thus limiting the effects in 
surrounding environment. However, the performance and coverage of friction modifier 
product may be limited if under occasional traffic only. Hi-rail application options are also 
available.  
c)  Locomotive Flange Lubrication: is typically recommended for mainline operations, 
solid state flange (stick) lubrication on locomotive leading wheelsets can, over time, help 
to lubricate the gauge corner/flange contact region, thus increasing the required L/V ratio 
necessary for flange climb. This application would be difficult on the outgo side of the car 
dumper due to the low volume of locomotives traversing this area  
If a wayside lubrication system is to be used, it is important that the product is only applied 
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during wagon movements into the curve itself. Disadvantages of any lubrication/friction 
modifier system include; the ongoing cost and maintenance associated with these devices 
and carry-over or leakage onto other sections of rail or track work. Regular maintenance is 
required to keep these systems operational and also clean up any carry-over onto the stock 
rail. 
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Chapter 3 METHODOLOGY 
Information gathered in the literature review stage indicates that the most probable cause 
of wagon derailment at CD3P and CD4P is flange climb. This methodology will review 
the existing site conditions and available data from the last derailment in a systematic 
manner consistent with the guidelines provided in AS4292.7 “Railway Safety 
Management” and compare them to the intended design criteria for this track section. The 
wheel profile will be measured for the first derailed wagon and the rail profile at the last 
derailment point. This will be measured and compared to the new rail profile. The 
methodology will also consider the wayside detection system results, CITEC dumper 
profiles and IOC data available and consider any inconsistencies.  
The optimal checkrail gap will also be calculated using recorded data as part of the 
methodology. 
3.1 Existing Conditions 
The existing track consists of 68kg/m rail fastened to concrete sleepers with Pandrol e-
Clips. A concrete apron has been built outside the dumper by concreting in the existing 
sleepers. The concrete section transitions rapidly from concrete embedded sleepers to direct 
laid concrete sleepers on ballast to a depth of approximately 120mm. The ballast in the 
section of interest is heavily fouled with iron ore fines and is not considered free draining. 
 
The outgoing side of car dumpers CD3P and CD4P are unique in their layout due to the 
immediate transition into a curve from the dumpers. The track radius trailing from CD3 is 
recorder as 245m and leads into an opposing radius of 600m before entering the CD3 empty 
car line according to the design drawing shown in figure 11. 
 
The positioner arm is on the in-go side of CD3P and CD4P. On the outgo side, there is an 
insulated rail joint directly below the edge of the roof and a concrete pad that comes out 
15m from the insulated rail joint. A check rail starts just after the insulated rail joint at the 
end or the concrete slab and runs for approximately 30m along the curve section of the 
outgo track until about 600mm south of the -1.3km level crossing. The crossing is made 
for a single vehicle and has a Dragging Equipment Detectors (DED) either side and a      de-
railer 24m North of the crossing. The last 3 derailments occurred between the crossing and 
a single direction de-railer.  
 
Track signaling circuits provide broken rail detection for the main running rails, with 
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additional asset protection provided by monitoring of the rolling stock using DED’s at the 
site. The DEDs on the out go track from CD3P are connected to the dumper control system 
and stop the dumping process when triggered.  
The CD4 and CD3 outgo tracks immediately out of the dumpers is protected through 
interlocking axle counters with the dumping cycle. Axle counters are used here because 
this section of track has had issues with current leakage due to the severely fouled ballast. 
The track gradient exiting the concrete slab was measured -0.017%, where the magnitude 
of the track gradient increases to -0.041% 500m further along the track. 
3.2 Last Derailment Site Inspection 
The last derailment at CD4P took place at approximately 1155h on 29/06/2016 when the 
lead wheelset of wagon B25045 (at position 225 of 234 wagons) climbed up the high rail, 
when it was noticed by rail operations personnel. The dumper operator was notified and 
halted the dumper indexing operation. By this time leading wheelset of wagon 25045 
came off the rails and continued until the wagon came to rest about 6m from the point of 
derailment, about 20m North of the crossing. It was observed the lateral offset of the 
wheel from the correct position on track was on the order of 30cm. The overall view of 
the exit area from CD4P at the time of the derailment is shown in Figure 15. 
  
 
Figure 15 Aerial layout of CD3P and CD4P 
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3.3 Typical consist composition  
Trains typically consist of 236 wagons, consisting of a mix of Q series and B series wagons. 
Each wagon is 9.3m long and 3.3m wide, giving a total consist length including draw gear 
of approximately 2300m. During the dumping process the mainline locomotives are 
uncoupled from the wagons and a break car is attached to the consist to enable controlled 
movement of the consist by the dumper indexing arm. 
 
3.4 Track Design 
 
Figure 16: Parker Point dumpers track profile. 
It should also be noted that the CD3 and CD4 empty car line horizontal curves do not have 
a transition spiral to ease rolling stock into the bend which may have helped the situation 
due to the wagons being propelled instead of pulled by the positioner arm. However 
according to the requirements laid out in DC-R001 Railway Route Infrastructure – Civil & 
Track, it is not required and there is a lack of space to install one. 
 
Track geometry for yards and workshop areas, according to the current version of DC-
R001, Railway Route and Infrastructure – Track and Civil are: 
• Minimum horizontal radius of 300m desirable, with a 250m radius 
absolute minimum. 
• Transition spirals are generally not provided. 
• Maximum gradient of 0.1%. 
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3.5 Human factors 
There is no evidence of fatigue, human error or other factors influencing any key personnel 
who were involved in the derailment. After the train is set in the dumper the process is 
automated. 
3.6 Track Condition 
All sleepers and fasteners were in good condition. The ballast was heavily contaminated 
with ore in the location however there was no evidence of significant movement of the 
track under load.  
 
Figure 17: Contaminated Ballast 
3.7 Track Geometry 
The most important factor for the check rail was discovered from both eye witness 
derailment reports and site specific measurement and verification. The location where the 
concrete pad transitions to the earth laid sleepers creates a section of rapid modulus change. 
The addition of water to this area creates a situation where the soil elastic modulus is 
reduced and the continued weight of the wagon consists generates a dip. Continuous poor 
maintenance practice including wash-off, poor drainage and water run off also contributes 
to the dip in the track. This decreases the vertical force on the check rail and subsequently 
the ability of the check rail to resist lateral movement.  
 
On the 6th of March 2016 It was measured that a ‘dip’ in the tracks was also evident. This 
dip was found as part of a derailment investigation and is assumed to be another factor in 
the derailments. The location of the dip is located just prior to the suspected point of the 
most derailment. This dip combined with small radius and no transition curve causes 
wagons to experience higher lateral forces at both the CD3 and CD4 outgo tracks.  
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The geometry defect is believed to be created by a combination of fouled ballast and water 
run-off from the dumper. The dip in the track has been recorded historically and despite 
previous rectification, the combination of continued washing down, poor drainage, 
combined with inadequate transition stiffness at the end of the concrete slab, caused the 
track to subside outside CD3P.  
The below table shows the track dip measurements for CD3 tail track high leg with respect 
to the derailment location (0m). The 50mm laser height measurements indicate where the 
laser origin was at the time of measurement. 
 
Figure 18 Deviation of rail height with respect to averaged gradient 
 
Figure 19: Evidence of Dip in Track 
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3.8 Track Measurement 
Measurements were taken of the gauge and superelevation along CD4P on 28th June 2016. 
Measurements started from approximately 600mm back from the edge of the concrete 
apron and went north to the crossing. 
 
Measurement Superelevation Track gauge 
1 7 1441 
2 6 1441.5 
3 6 1440 
4 6.5 1439 
5 5 1440.5 
6 6 1442 
7 7 1440 
8 7 1439 
9 6 1438.5 
10 5 1439 
11 6 1440 
12 6 1439 
13 6.5 1439 
14 8 1439 
15 9 1442.5 
16 8 1444 
17 8 1445 
 
3.9 Radius of outgoing curve 
Actual measurements determined the radius to be 245m on average with a minimum radius 
of 208m. The curve radius for CD3P empty car track, outgo side, was designed to be below 
the minimum radius stated in RTIO’s Rail Design Criteria. 
 
Distance (m)	 Versine (m)	 Radius (m)	
1	 0.060	 208.33	
2	 0.058	 215.52	
3	 0.055	 227.27	
4	 0.053	 235.85	
5	                 0.050	 250.00	
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6	 0.050	 250.00	
7	 0.052	 240.38	
8	 0.054	 231.48	
9	 0.055	 227.27	
10	 0.056	 223.21	
11	 0.058	 215.52	
12	 0.058	 215.52	
13	 0.056	 223.21	
14	 0.055	 227.27	
(end concrete)  15	 0.050	 250.00	
16	 0.045	 277.78	
17	 0.042	 297.62	
18	 0.040	 312.50	
19	 0.042	 297.62	
20	 0.046	 271.74	
21	 0.050	 250.00	
3.10 Rail profile measurement 
The rail profiles were measured using a Miniprof instrument at 2m increments, starting 
16m back from the concrete apron. The profiles are shown in Figure 18, with the high rail 
profiles on the left side, and the low rail profiles on the right. The datum point for these 
profiles was the southern side of the IRJ, and the transition from the apron to the sleepered 
track was at the 18.5m position from this datum, corresponding to the edge of the concrete 
apron. Little wear was evident in the high rail up to the weld. Beyond this weld, the high 
rail exhibited significantly more gauge face wear; however, this was well beyond the 
relevant region where the wheel climbed the high rail. The low rail profile in the region of 
the derailment seems to be quite heavily worn, given that the traffic consists of slow 
moving empty wagons; this may indicate heavy loading in the region related to the vertical 
dip, but is not considered directly causal to the derailment.  
The gauge width was extracted from the MiniProf profiles. According to these 
measurements, the gauge was well controlled on the concrete apron, at a value of 1435mm, 
but significantly increased at the transition from the apron to the sleepered track. The gauge 
width returned to a lower value beyond this transition region, but gradually increased along 
the curve, with another jump around the transition from the re-railed region at about 32m 
from the datum point, with the more heavily side worn rail exhibiting a gauge width with 
an average value of 1445mm.  
The track at CD4P goes from tangent through the dumper to a relatively tight curve (av. 
245m radius), with no spiral transition. This curve starts at the dumper area, but the region 
beyond the dumper apron is also considered critical as the steering of bogies under empty 
wagons is not good, such that the wheels would tend to flange heavily at the start of this 
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curve.  
 
Figure 20 The below tables are track dip measurements for CD4 tail track high leg with respect to the 
derailment location (0m). The 50mm laser height measurements indicate where the laser origin was at the 
time of measurement. 
   
 
 
 
Figure 21 High Leg track profile at point of climb initiation 
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Figure 22 Figure 5.4 High Leg track profiles in 1m intervals 
3.11 Existing Checkrail 
The check rail itself consists of a number of 200mm wide brackets fixed to the sleeper with 
chemical anchors. Bolted to the top of the brackets is 125x125x16 even angle. There is 
approximately 30 metres of check rail outside each car dumper. Each 30m run of check rail 
is made up of three lengths of angle iron. The face of current check rail sits 105mm from 
the gauge face of the rail along most of its length. Outside CD3P this increases to 115mm 
for several metres. The brackets hold the check rail to roughly the same curve radius as the 
rail.  
 
Figure 23 Existing checkrail layout 
A review of the gap between the gauge face of the rail and the check rail at CD3P and 
CD4P was undertaken. The gap of the existing checkrail allows for the wheel of the wagon 
to have travelled past the centre point on the head of the rail before having any impact 
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3.12 Wheel profiles 
Wheel tread readings were recorded by the OCCM system on the 27/06/16 and 18/07/16 
for wagons B20270 and B20045 respectively and are as follows: 
B20270 OCCM data 
Units in 
mm 
Flange Thickness 
(Limit = 26.5 
Minimum) 
Tread Thickness 
(Limit = 27 
Minimum) 
Tread Hollowness 
(Limit = 2.4 
Maximum) 
 Left Right Left Right Left Right 
Axle 1 33.3 34.6 41 42 0.8 -1.0 
Axle 2 37.1 33.1 41 42 -0.5 1.1 
Axle 3 33.7 34.2 42 42 -0.6 -1.1 
Axle 4 36.6 33.8 41 42 -1.7 1.1 
Axle 5 33.0 33.8 41 42 0.6 -1.5 
Axle 6 35.7 33.0 41 42 -0.3 0.9 
Axle 7 33.9 34.6 41 41 0.9 -0.9 
Axle 8 30.1 27.8 39 39 -2.2 -1.5 
 
B20045 OCCM data 
Units in 
mm 
Flange Thickness 
(Limit = 26.5 
Minimum) 
Tread Thickness 
(Limit = 27 
Minimum) 
Tread Hollowness 
(Limit = 2.4 
Maximum) 
 Left Right Left Right Left Right 
Axle 1 31.9 30.0 40 40 -1.8 -1.6 
Axle 2 32.5 31.2 39 39 -1.8 -1.5 
Axle 3 32.8 31.5 39 38 -1.6 -1.6 
Axle 4 32.7 30.5 39 39 -1.8 -1.5 
Axle 5 32.4 30.4 39 39 -1.6 -1.6 
Axle 6 32.6 31.3 38 37 -1.8 -1.4 
Axle 7 32.9 30.8 38 38 -1.7 -1.6 
Axle 8 32.1 30.4 39 39 -1.8 -1.5 
 
Note for above tables, wheel on high leg side of derailed wheel set is highlighted bold. 
Once B20270 had been shunted into 7 Mile RSM for maintenance, the wheel profiles were 
measured. Unfortunately, B20045 was missed. Figure 21 shows the profile of wheel R1 of 
wagon B25270 – the wheel that climbed the high leg of the rail. 
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Figure 24 Wheel profile of B20270’s derailing wheel (R1) 
3.13 Vehicle types and alignment 
Maintenance History of wagon (B20270) 
Wagons B20270 and B25270 were commissioned on the 1/08/2014. 
 
B20270 maintenance history 
This wagon pair completed a 2-year service on 30/06/16 after the post-derailment 
inspection, just over 1 month early. There were no reports of misalignment of any 
components or irregularities 
Maintenance History (B20045) 
Wagons B20045 and B25045 were commissioned on the 17/09/2013. 
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B20045 Maintenance History 
This wagon pair underwent their 2-year service on 1/07/2016 after the post-derailment 
inspection, 9.5 months overdue. Wheel set 1 was replaced on the 22/05/16, just over a 
month before derailment. There were no reports of misalignment of any components or 
irregularities and the wagon was in service. 
Visual observation and site accounts indicate that the wheel set of B25270 underwent a 
twist around the high leg rail which lifted the low leg side wheel approximately 20mm.  
3.14 In Train Forces 
The dumper positioner arm is controlled by 13 variable voltage/variable frequency (VVVF) 
drives. These drives are controlled by a PLC that controls the positioner arm movement 
against torque, speed and acceleration limits. It also logs the positioner arms location and 
the torque the drivers are producing at a 1 hertz frequency.  
The CITEC dumper profiles were analysed for the minimum, maximum and average for 
both torque and speed for each of the 13 motors and nothing indicated abnormal operation. 
the positioner arm showing an average torque of 341.4 Nm for the motors. This is not an 
unusually high torque for the dumper. 
 
IOC data taken from the few months before derailment shows a ramping up of in train 
compressive forces during approximately the last 30 wagons. The figure below shows an 
overlay of 3 separate IOC trips through the dumper with varying position within the consist. 
The overlay shows that the compressive forces can ramp up to 80 tonnes compressive force. 
 
Figure 25 Overlay of in-train forces during dumping of last wagons 
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3.15 Coupler Forces  
A brief review of coupler forces was performed on the data from the IOC wagons, and 
found that the coupler forces acting on the empty ore wagons during the indexing cycle 
were quite variable, and can be very large. In the recent data from IOCs that transited CD4P 
in the past two months, there were 18 runs from 11 IOCs that were within 10 pairs from 
the end of a tag. These identified that the compressive loads increase gradually to a 
maximum value as the wagons ahead are pushed by those nearer the exit of the dumper. 
The peak loads varied from about -40 tonnes (IOC 3934) force to a maximum of -100 
tonnes (IOC 30301) force, where IOC 3934 was within 7 pairs and IOC 30301 was within 
3 pairs from the end of the tag respectively.  
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Chapter 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Review of existing conditions indicates that there are multiple possible contributing factors 
to the flange climb derailments. 
4.1 Risk assessment 
4.1.1 Safety in Design 
The design of this check rail in line with the requirements of Regulation 3.140 of division 
12 of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 1996 outlines the design risk and 
identifies: 
• The hazards identified as part of the design process that arise from the 
design of the end product, or to which a person at the construction site 
would be exposed;  
• The designer’s assessment of the risk of injury or harm resulting from 
those hazards;  
• The designer’s action taken to reduce those risks;  
• Any parts of the design where hazards have been identified but not 
resolved.  
The risk assessment shown in appendix C, identifies the hazards that are considered of a 
non-standard nature, unusual, specific to the design or otherwise noteworthy. Risks such 
as working at heights, slips/trips and working around live rail are examples of risks 
considered standard.   
4.12 Consequential effects and ethics 
Development of a custom and fit for purpose design, followed by effective implementation 
will improve the sustainability and efficiency of the RTIO rail network and will reduce 
downtime. The ability to reduce the hazards created by derailment will improve the safety 
for all personnel working on and near the car dumpers. Given the number of derailments 
occurring on the area, it is imperative that this project assesses all aspects associated with 
the derailments and does not overlook the contributing underlying causes, including track 
geometry, rail wear and rolling stock interface. The pressures associated with 
implementing a design on an active rail network generally dictate that the solution will be 
implemented quickly with minimal track closure. The pressures to complete the installation 
in a minimal timeframe can lead to compromised design and may ultimately lead to the 
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installation of an ineffective solution. The installation of an ineffective solution is not only 
a waste of money but also maintains or reduces the safety of the network. This project will 
deliver an effective and fit for purpose design with due regard for the constructability of 
the solution, ensuring an optimal outcome.  
4.13 Track Condition 
The high rail of the outgo track was measured using the MiniProf Rail device and, while 
visually deformed, was found to be within Rail Division’s standards for rail wear. The 
Track and Civil Code of Practice (Vol 1 – Rail) outlines the maximum allowable head loss 
for curves less than 1000m as 35% (area), the figure below indicates the rail was within 
these limits.  
 
Figure 26 Figure 6.1 CD4P outgo high rail (red) and new rail (dark red) profiles 
 
The side wear measured is also within the Code of Practice’s limit of 10mm, reaching a 
maximum of around 8mm. The track limits are set in the code of practise and the track is 
passed and failed by the inspectors against these limits. This being said, the rail head wear 
limits are designed to prevent fatigue related rail failures only and do not consider 
wheel/rail steering interface (this may have an influence on the limits but the main objective 
is to reduce the risk of rail failures). Therefore, while the high leg rail of the CD4P outgo 
curve may be within rail wear limits, the profile is not measured against criteria for wheel 
interaction which will leave the elevated derailment risk unnoticed in the current 
maintenance systems. 
The high rail of the tail track had a severely worn gauge face which enabled a lower contact 
angle between rail face and wheel, leading to derailment through flange climb.  
The ‘lip’ that had developed on the gauge face creates a shallow wheel/rail contact angle. 
Once the wheel is pushed high enough, the lateral force required to continue the flange 
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climb is much lower than with a standard rail profile. The below figure demonstrates the 
interaction between the derailed wheel profile at the point of derailment for wagon B25270. 
The second derailed wagon, B25045, was not recorded with the wheel MiniProf.  
 
Figure 27 Wheel and rail profiles at location derailment 
Once the wheel is hard against the flange (similar to the above figure) the gauge face ‘lip’ 
can contact the wheel’s flange (if the flange is high enough) allowing the wheel to ride up 
onto the lip due to the lower contact angle. The wheel will then only have the desired steep 
contact angle with the rail head for a short vertical distance which greatly increases the 
chance of derailment. The wheel will be more susceptible to short periods of high lateral 
force pushing it out of the rail. For comparison, the figure below shows the contact the 
derailed wheel would have had with a section of new rail. Note the contact angle is much 
steeper at the wheel/rail contact point and will stay steep for a large portion of the possible 
derailment path. 
 
Figure 28 Wheel with new rail profile 
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It is suspected that due to the severely worn profile of the high rail, a rail with the profile 
of a new rail would have greatly reduced the risk of derailment along the curve due to the 
steeper contact angle. 
4.14 Track Dip 
The measured dip in the track was small enough in this instance that it was not considered 
to be a contributing factor on its own, however the addition of high in train forces from the 
dumper indexing arm is viewed as significant. The dip depth of 10mm over 4m is outside 
of the class A track target Geometry limits but falls within the defect limit. The fact that 
the wheel started climbing on a section without a large change in rail height indicated that 
the track geometry had little to no influence on the cause of the latest derailment on this 
single occasion. This should not discount the fact that this issue requires rectification.  
4.15 Wheel profile 
The measured wheel profile does not appear to be a factor in the derailments. The wheel 
set condition of both wagons that derailed during the 28 and 29 July derailments is not 
considered to be a contributing factor for the derailments. The wheel profiles of all the 
wheels of wagon pair B20270/B25270 were measured using the Wheel Miniprof.  
 
Figure 29 Derailed wheel profiles (Black is new wheel) 
OCCM wheel profiles were available for both. All OCCM measurements were within shop 
limits in accordance with Rolling Stock Shop Standards and the Standard for Qualifying 
Wheel Sets. There were no obvious errors in wheel profiles for both derailed wheel sets. 
The derailed wheel set on wagon B25270, although still within limits, had slightly shallow 
wheels:  The wheels on each occasion are within the design tolerances and are regularly 
maintained to a sufficient standard. Flat wheels and defective wheels are identified by asset 
protection devices and have not been identified  
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Figure 30 Using the AAR Wheel Gauge to measure wheel flange height (left) and thickness (right) 
4.16 In train force data analysis 
The risk of derailments increases substantially under the combination of high lateral loads 
and reduced vertical loads. While the reduction of dumper torque would certainly help, this 
comes with a substantial economic penalty, as it would tend to increase the cycle time for 
dumping. On a cumulative basis, this is significant, and would become more so in the 
absence of realignment.  
Instrumented Ore Car in-train force readings indicate a large increase in compressive forces 
during indexing the last 30 or so wagons, leading to a larger lateral force applied to wheels 
along the CD4 and CD3 tail track curve. This force has been measured (pre-derailment) to 
be upwards of 80 tonnes, whereas the general compressive force during the rest of the 
dumping cycle averages around 45 tonnes.  
 
The presence of a dip can lead to substantial unloading of wheels, due to the high forces, 
as the coupler connection to the wagon ahead can support a large vertical load in addition 
to the horizontal load. This is much more likely when there are high compressive 
longitudinal forces present at the indexing arm and possible brake stick. 
 
Figure 31 Indexing cycle 
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4.17 Calculate lateral forces 
The track layout in this area has been discussed with a key feature of the tracks from both 
dumpers is that they are on relatively tight curves of less than 250m. The curves start just 
inside the dumper buildings. This layout was unavoidable given the location of these 
dumpers, but means that these locations are particularly prone to high lateral loads due to 
the curvature of the track towards the high rail leg. In effect, the ore wagons can be 
considered as a long column, which is prone to buckling instability if it is insufficiently 
constrained under compressive loads.  
 
Derailments where the wagons were being indexed at the time generally occur at the same 
location just clear of the concrete apron on the outgo side. It can be seen that the derailments 
while being propelled by locos occur within the first curve but may be further from the 
dumper.  
When propelling a consist of wagons on flat or uphill alignment through curves, the 
frictional resistance of the preceding cars increases the lateral force applied to cars located 
closer to the locomotive or indexing arm.  
 
Figure 32 Lateral force due to resistance of wagons 
  
Hence, it is not always the leading cars that derail, but cars closer to the locomotive or 
indexing arm.  
The resistance is highest in tight curve situations, with dry unlubricated rails and freshly 
machined wheels. The lateral force vs. vertical force ratio (L/V) is often used as an indicator 
of adverse rail-wheel contact conditions that can lead to flange climb as governed by the 
Nadal equation. 
 
The main variable in this situation (given geometric conditions) is friction, and by 
controlling the adhesion levels at the rail-wheel interface it is possible to control the creep 
forces and hence L/V ratio of the vehicles.  
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Creep forces and hunting are reduced in cases of wet rail or modified (lower) adhesion 
levels. Hence it seems less likely that derailments would have occurred when rails were 
wet. Adhesion levels vary considerably due to environmental factors and the condition of 
the wheel and rail surfaces in contact.  
Tribometer instruments can be used to measure adhesion levels at slow speed, walking 
pace. In this process brakes are applied to a measuring wheel with controlled loading which 
defines the limiting adhesion as the wheel begins to stall/slip. Typically, top of rail values, 
without lubricant contamination, deliver friction values (µ) in the 0.4-0.5 range. These 
instruments tend to saturate at ~0.6, such as for freshly ground rails.  
Under normal operating conditions the values outside of the dumpers is measured at ~0.5 
or less. It is often determined that, with speeds of 5-15km/h, the wagons will retain higher 
adhesion levels and hence develop higher lateral forces and L/V ratios. Lateral forces 
 
The track design radius of the PPCD4TAIL curve is below the recommended absolute 
minimum radius specified in Railway Route Infrastructure – Civil & Track engineering 
standard (DC-R001). Section 10.9 of the standard states a “minimum horizontal radius of 
300m, with a 250m radius absolute minimum. Transition spirals are generally not 
provided”. The design track radius of the CD4 (and CD3) tail tracks are 245m, where the 
actual radius was measured to be less than this value.  
The higher the lateral forces applied to the wheel/rail interaction, the higher the chances of 
derailment. In this situation the lateral forces cannot be reduced through increasing the 
track radius so must be controlled through the reduction of in-train forces. 
The two components of in-train forces along this curve are: 
• The force exerted by the positioner arm indexing the consist forward, and; 
• The resistance from pushing the rest of the consist. 
This resistance is a combination of rolling resistance (wheels interacting with the rail, 
friction in bearings, etc.) and inertia (moving a body from rest). Both are largely 
unchangeable, although good wheel and rail profiles will help reduce this resistance.  
4.18 Friction control  
It can be seen that the absence of lubrication and friction control results in highly variable 
conditions depending on the action of wheels ahead of wagons that derail. The freshly 
machined wheels that scrape and clean the rail, lift the effective adhesion due to the 
machined face and tight radius. The Nadal formula, defining the required L/V ratio to 
satisfy wheel climb is simplistic yet indicative of the primary requirements. It incorporates 
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the contact or flange angle and the adhesion level. It can be shown that a lubricated rail 
offers greater resistance to climb as does a steeper flange angle. Hence the greater 
resistance to start a wheel climb reduces as the wheel moves on to the gauge corner or tread 
and onto a flat surface.  
The saving grace in these cases is the much larger rolling radius at the flange that provides 
a strong restoring effect by trying to steer the wheelset back onto track.  
 
High adhesion limits such as those that occur with the cleaning action of machined wheels, 
reduce the safety margin where wheel unloading or wheel lift become more effective in 
starting and maintaining wheel climb.  
The L/V ratios of ~0.5 in 230m radius curves apply to standard wheel profiles 
corresponding to new wheels entering service. Worn-in wheels, fare better with lower L/V 
ratios, other factors being the same. Worn bogies with a degree of wear/slop in the damping 
system, whilst less desirable for mainline, tend to curve more favorably and are less likely 
to climb the rail. An extrapolation of these results to higher adhesion limits would increase 
L/V ratios to the point where they would satisfy the basic requirements for wheel climb. 
Consequently, the inability to screen rolling stock for the right of passage, requires friction 
modifiers and lubricants to raise the overall insurance level and resist wheel climb 
derailments.  
 
Friction modifiers typically try to stabilize adhesion at ~0.3 and would offer some 
improvement in derailment resistance. In addition, rail gauge face/flange lubrication would 
be required to increase the safety margin. Given that 0.2 friction levels are realistic, then a 
doubling of the L/V threshold would be achievable.  
4.19 Changes to dumper and track  
In 2007 and again in 2015 a positioner torque limit was applied to reduce the amount of 
compression pushed into the train. A train brake pipe gradient limit was applied to limit the 
potential brake application.  
Post 2009 derailments a more conservative positioner torque limit (500Nm) was 
implemented for the last 40 cars of the train. More sophisticated limits were implemented 
for brake pipe pressures and gradients to detect possible sticky brake events. Post 2010 
derailments the heavily worn rails at the CD3P outgo were replaced. The check rail was 
installed early 2013 and the existing DED moved from just clear of the concrete apron to 
just before the level crossing and an additional DED installed after the crossing. A re-railer 
was also installed after the first curve.  
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Prior to 2013, derailments that occurred during indexing, occurred immediately after the 
DED and often were not detected until they caused a larger derailment. While the checkrail 
has not prevented derailments it has reduced the derailments from 2 or more wheelsets to 
1 wheelset. The movement of the DED has significantly reduced the consequence.  
Since the last derailment in June 2016 the implementation of new drainage at the end of 
the concrete apron as well as re-rail of the high leg has been undertaken 
4.1 Applying Nadal limits to current check rail design 
Since derailments have occurred at the CD3P and CD4P dumpers, the Nadal equation can 
be used to estimate the minimum lateral force occurring to cause a derailment. The static 
coefficient of friction for steel on steel ranges from 0.5 to 0.8 depending on surface 
condition. For new wheels θ is approximately 72°. After machining this changes to 75° as 
Rio Tinto machine to AAR standards. These numbers give a lowest L/V as 0.6 with a 
friction factor of 0.8 but could be up to 1 if the friction factor is closer to 0.5. Hence the 
lateral force on the wagon could be equal to the vertical force from the 21000kg empty 
weight. ./ = 	 tan 72 − 0.81 + 0.8×tan	(72) = 0.657 . = 	0.657×/ 
It is important to note that the L/V ratio increases as theta increases or the coefficient of 
friction decreases. Hence for a lower coefficient of friction or greater contact angle 
(0≤θ≤90) the system can sustain higher lateral forces without derailment. 
 
Originally the wheel set first climbs the face of the rail and then climbs the face of the 
check rail. Numbers can be applied to the Nadal equation to show the likely outcome of 
this situation. First the wheel climbing the rail will be examined. As this is a tight curve, it 
is assumed that the steel is well polished and a friction factor of 0.5 will be chosen. It is 
also assumed that each wheel set supports a quarter of the empty wagons 21,000kg mass. 
This means each wheel would have a vertical force of 2625kg (25.75kN). ./ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) = tan 72 − 0.51 + 0.5×tan	(72) = 1.0153 . = 1.0153/ = 1.0153×2625 = 2665.2	[BC] 
Hence the lateral force on the front wheel set must be at least 2665.2kg for the wheel to 
derail. Once the wheel has ridden up into the centre of the high rail, the check rail is struck. 
For the check rail it was shown that the approximate contact angle was still 72 degrees. 
Since the check rail is not struck regularly (from inspection) we will assume a friction 
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factor of 0.8 for rusty steel. ./ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) = tan 72 − 0.81 + 0.8×tan	(72) = 0.65788 . = 0.65788/ = 0.65788×2625 = 1726.935	[BC] 
Hence if we originally had 2665.2kg of lateral force or greater to cause flange climb and 
the same conditions are continuing, the check rail will only be able to withstand 
1726.935kg of lateral force. Hence the wheel set will climb the check rail and derailment 
will not be prevented. 
4.2 Assessment of current checkrail effectiveness 
General assessment of the existing checkrail shows that it is ineffective in achieving its 
intended function in its current configuration. The fact that it has a gap is so large that it 
allows for the flange to have passed across the centre point of the head of the rail as well 
as the lack of bracketing and therefore potential for deflection causes the existing rail to be 
ineffective. The combination of these two factors reduces the check rails effectiveness far 
below the theoretical value. In this instance it is assumed that a 77% improvement that 
could have been achieved under ideal conditions. Assuming a 1:1 L/V ratio without the 
check rail, the moment would reduce the effective vertical force on the wheel. 
 
 It is important to note the possible disconnect between the improvement in lateral force 
resistance by alteration to the checkrail. The improvement in theoretical values and 
resistance to derailment and the improvement in derailment occurrence numbers is not 
necessarily guaranteed or directly correlated. For instance, if alterations to the check rail 
show that we can sustain 177% of the lateral force that the current design allows for but 
dumper events, however the force created at the dumper indexing arm, that cause a 
derailment are always 200% of the lateral force that the new checkrail design allows, there 
will be no reduction in derailments, despite the new design being 77% better than the old 
design. Further information is required regarding the indexing forces from the dumpers. 
 
As well as rotating a bogie to determine flange way clearances, the bogie can be rotated to 
emulate a derailment. The positioning of the wheels and the bogie can then be found at the 
point that the check rail contacts the wheel during derailment. This is shown in “Figure 33: 
Contact on check rail during derailment (red)” below. 
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Figure 33: Contact on check rail during derailment (red) 
 
Once this contact point is found, a slice can then be taken through the wheel to see what 
the cross-section of the wheel is at the contact point. From this cross section the contact 
angle can be calculated. 
 
Figure 34: Section View: Contact angle of wheel on check rail 
There are a couple of other factors that affect this number slightly, such as the wheel at the 
other end of the axle riding on the rail head (and thus changing the wheel set angle) and the 
horizontal and vertical deflection of the check rail. This diagram highlights why the current 
check rail often doesn’t work. A wheel set derails on the outer rail with a certain lateral 
force as per the Nadal equation presented earlier. The outer wheel is already on the flat 
head of the rail before the inner wheel strikes the check rail. Re-applying the Nadal equation 
to the check rail, there is an equal or lower contact angle as well as likely a higher friction 
factor (due to the check rail being rusted and not polished like the rail surface). This means 
the check rail can sustain a lower lateral force then the external rail before flange climb 
derailment occurs. Hence if the force that begun the derailment continues for long enough, 
it will push the wheel set over the check rail as well. Once the first wheel set has been 
derailed, the angle of attack greatly increases. This lowers the contact angle (a 90-degree 
angle of attack would have a contact angle of about 36 degrees) and makes it easier for the 
other wheel sets to derail.  
 
The efficiency of the check rail can be increased by moving the check rail in closer to the 
wagon wheel. This increases the lateral force needed to cause flange climb derailment as 
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the outside wheel must climb the rail at the same time that the inside wheel is climbing the 
check rail. This increases the amount of vertical force available to push the bogie back 
down into its proper running position. 
4.3 Limitations from Locomotive Wheel Base 
The longer wheel base of the locomotives limits the amount that the check rail can be 
moved in closer to the gauge face of the rail.  If the check rail is moved in too close the 
locomotive wheels will be “wedged” between the gauge face of the rail and the check rail. 
Nytram plots similar to those done for the wagon wheels suggest a 60mm gap would be 
appropriate. A decision may need to be made for construction tolerances although if it is 
only a small distance out, the check rail will likely wear into the ideal position.  
Measurements were also taken using a camera underneath a stationary locomotive part way 
through the curve. This shows the locomotive in a static condition. It is difficult to use this 
method to come up with an accurate measurement as low image quality, perspective and 
the assumption that the check rail is straight all distort the values. Red lines show the 
original gap estimation and blue lines show a revised estimation. The revised lines would 
allow us to have a 65mm gap before the loco wheel touches the check rail. Measurements 
show 40mm between the check rail and the back of the loco wheel leaving 65mm of free 
space. What was not measured in the photo was the placement of the other wheel. This 
measurement should be repeated as accurately as possible prior to installing the check rail 
to verify design spacing from the drawings. 
4.4 Deflection 
In reality we are unlikely to see as big a benefit as identified for the mathematics due issues 
with both track condition and check rail design. The existing checkrail has up to a 2.36-
meter gap between brackets. This large distance has the potential to allow the checkrail to 
deflect. It can be seen from previous calculations that if the check rail deflects 5mm (from 
55mm to 60 mm) then our benefit drops from 77% over current case to 26%. It is likely the 
large gaps between the brackets will create a larger then 5mm deflection at points and hence 
the benefit of moving the check rail will vary between 77% better and no better along its 
length depending on the deflection. 
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4.5 Modification of existing check rail 
For a 60mm gap the inside wheel contacts the check rail when the outside wheel is mid-
way through climbing the high rail. 
 
Figure 35 Altered checkrail with 60mm gap 
It was shown from the Nytram diagrams that moving the check rail in to a 60mm gap would 
cause a                74-degree contact on the check rail. Again we will assume a friction factor 
of 0.5 for the rail and 0.8 for the check rail. The contact with the rail head was determined 
to be at 4.68mm in which corresponds to an angle of 41.5 degrees. It is also important to 
note that each wheel has a 2625 vertical force on it. .F/ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) = tan 74 − 0.81 + 0.8×tan	(74) = 0.7091 .H/ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) = tan 41.5 − 0.51 + 0.5×tan	(41) = 0.2667 . = .F + .H = 0.9665/ = 0.9758 ∗ 2625 = 2561	[BC] 
This reflects the absolute worst case performance of the check rail due to geometry changes 
alone. This is only just lower (100kg) than the peak lateral force required to climb the rail 
head on its own. It is likely however that the check rail will have more frequent contact and 
this will polish the surface, lowering the friction factor.  
4.6 Increasing the check rail height 
Moving the contact point onto the flat at the back of the wheel would create a huge 
difference in the Nadal ratio. The obvious way to do this is to raise the check rail height. It 
is not possible to go above the height of the fixing however the fixing is more than 12mm 
above the height of the check rail. The Nadal ratio for an angle of 90 degrees is as follows: 
 ./ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) = tan 90 − 0.81 + 0.8×tan	(90) = 1.25 . = 1.444×/ = 1.444×2625 = 3790.5 
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If the coefficient of friction is taken at 0.5 the L/V ratio increases to 2.  At first glance this 
is a large win however this effect is not actually realised. On closer inspection, as the check 
rail height is increased, the contact point moves up and out on the wheel. This leads to it 
still contacting on the curved surface on the outside of the wheel which creates the same 
72-degree angle. It does however slightly increase the amount of time the lateral force must 
be applied to create a derailment. 
4.7  Moving the contact face 
The existing check rail can be moved by either manufacturing new sets of angle iron or 
facing the angle iron with steel plate. The contact surface should be moved to 60mm away 
from the gauge face of the rail. This gives a wear resistant surface that will give the 
improvements due to the geometry change. Hence facing the check rail with steel should 
give a low maintenance solution will give significant improvement to the lateral force 
resistance. 
In addition, moving the contact surface should also halve the angle of attack. This will 
increase the climb distance required for derailment. 
4.8 Checkrail Gap reduction 
Should the gap between checkrail and stock rail be reduced for a 60mm gap, the geometry 
and the action of the checkrail will change. The change will cause the inside wheel to 
contact the check rail when the outside wheel is mid-way through climbing the high rail. 
The distance between the check rail and the gauge face of the rail allows the wheel to first 
ride over the high rail and then ride over the check rail. While this does increase the time 
personnel have to react before a severe derailment occurs, it does not reduce the number of 
incidents. Theoretically, the check rail should be moved so that the wheels must ride over 
the high rail and the check rail simultaneously, increasing the necessary lateral force to 
cause a derailment. However, this ignores deficiencies in both track condition and check 
rail design. Deflection in the check rail between the supporting brackets will reduce much 
of the benefit. In addition, the dip caused by water run off at the end of the CD3P concrete 
pad causes the weight to lift off the leading wheels of the wagon, further reducing check 
rail effectiveness. In this case the moving of the check rail will not likely reduce the 
occurrences of derailments but may actually increase the severity. 
 
The table below shows the results if the check rail is assumed to be polished by the passing 
of rail traffic. 
  
 46 
 
RAIL	AND	CHECK	RAIL	@60mm	Gap	
RAIL	SIDE	L/V	RATIO	
CHECK	RAIL	SIDE	LV	
RATIO	 TOTAL	L/V	RATIO	 %	IMPROVEMENT	
μ	 L/V	 μ	 L/V	 	 	
0.5	 0.26673269	 0.5	 1.088824063	 1.355556752	 33.51%	
0.5	 0.26673269	 0.6	 0.933698423	 1.200431113	 18.23%	
0.5	 0.26673269	 0.7	 0.810014662	 1.076747352	 6.05%	
0.5	 0.26673269	 0.8	 0.709093134	 0.975825824	 0%	
 
Finally, it is worth taking note at how much the L/V ratio contributed by the rail side 
changes as the check rail is moved. The change in check rail placement has a minimal 
change in the check rail L/V ratio due to the contact point moving further out as the angle 
of attack decreases. 
 
Check Rail to Gauge 
Face Gap [mm] 
Contact Angle 
[degrees] 
Resulting Rail Side 
L/V Ratio (for μ=0.5) 
Check Rail L/V 
ratio 
70 22.3 -0.074576985	 1.088824063	
60 41.5 0.26673269	 1.088824063	
55 64.1 0.76829656	 1.088824063	
4.9 Increasing the check rail height 
Moving the contact point onto the flat at the back of the wheel would create a huge 
difference in the Nadal ratio. The obvious way to do this is to raise the check rail height. It 
is not possible to go above the height of the fixing however the fixing is more than 12mm 
above the height of the check rail. The Nadal ratio for an angle of 90 degrees is as follows: ./ = 	 tan % − 31 + 3×tan	(%) = tan 90 − 0.81 + 0.8×tan	(90) = 1.25 . = 1.444×/ = 1.444×2625 = 3790.5 
If the coefficient of friction is taken at 0.5 the L/V ratio increases to 2.  At first glance this 
is a large win however this effect is not actually realised. On closer inspection, as the check 
rail height is increased, the contact point moves up and out on the wheel. This leads to it 
still contacting on the curved surface on the outside of the wheel which creates the same 
72-degree angle. It does however slightly increase the amount of time the lateral force must 
be applied to create a derailment. 
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4.10 Summary 
It is clear that abrupt changes in the vertical direction in either OR both the high leg OR 
the low leg significantly increases the risk of wheel climb derailments. This situation is 
further exacerbated by the abrupt shift from tangent to relatively tight curve, with bogies 
that have much less steering ability when the wagons are empty.  
 
The role of vertical dips in the running surface combined with high indexing forces is 
further indicated by the fact that the derailments at both dumpers took place at the same 
physical location, i.e. the drop- off from the concrete apron to the sleepered track, despite 
the fact that high longitudinal forces are present in the wagons both ahead and behind this 
position.  
In addition to the supporting information it is shown historically that, derailments at CD3P 
ceased for a period of 18 months after the re-rail of the high leg, at which time the sleepered 
section was reportedly also realigned.  
 
Monitoring of the vertical alignment should be introduced as a routine task, but need not 
be costly or time consuming. While detailed track measurements would be desirable, it 
should be noted that low angle photos at the right position such as those presented in this 
report can provide a permanent record of any significant dips that may be present, and can 
be made from positions of safety, rather than taking possession of this location or 
suspending normal dumper operations. While periodic realignment with a tamper is 
considered an effective containment measure, long term rectification would require 
dramatic improvement of the drainage at this position.  
Given the burden of fines, causing ballast contamination in this area, any drainage option 
would obviously need to be designed to avoid clogging.  
The Nadal calculation from the proposed alteration shows an ideal improvement of 77% 
lateral force resistance over the current case.  
If the track is kept in good condition, the check rail can be moved closer to increase its 
effectiveness.  
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Chapter 5 Chapter 5 – CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Project outcomes 
Evaluation of the above information and consideration of the mechanisms involved in the 
flange climb derailments indicates that the installation of a fit for purpose check rail would 
provide some benefit, however the ability to reduce the occurrences by maintaining rail 
profile and reducing in train forces by reducing the indexing arm forces is likely to provide 
a more cost effective outcome.  
5.2 Further work to be done 
The closure of the gap at the check rail may work in the short term measure, but this is an 
unproven approach, and may introduce new issues that are not anticipated. 
The inclusion of the check rail may see any vertical dips may be allowed to progress to 
comparable or worse levels rather than being resolved.  
Further work needs to be completed to ensure the yard limits for rail wear is considered for 
specific locations and the rail network maintenance team implement the recommendations. 
5.3 Recommendations 
 From the above considerations it is concluded that there are four distinct containment 
measures to significantly reduce the risk of derailments:  
1. Further reductions in the dumper torque when dumping the last quarter of 
the tag, to limit the peak compressive forces on the empty wagons; and/or  
2. Effective monitoring and intervention of any vertical misalignment at the 
concrete apron to sleepered track sections and reduction in checkrail gap.  
3. Re-rail the high leg curve on a more regular basis and when the side wear 
of the rail has reached 50% of the mainline limit. 
4. Remove the dip and eliminate re-occurrence by fixing drainage at both 
CD3P and CD4P and replacing ballast, gluing the ballast to ensure 
adequate transition stiffness. 
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Appendix A -  Project Specification 
 
 
 
University of Southern Queensland 
 
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND SURVEYING 
 
ENG4111/4112 Engineering Research Project 
PROJECT SPECIFICATION 
 
AUTHOR:  Lindsay Dobson 
 
TOPIC:  DUMPER DERAILMENT INVESTIGATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOM CHECK RAIL 
 
SUPERVISOR: STEVEN GOH 
 
ENROLMENT ENG4111 – EXT S1, 2016  
ENG4112 – EXT S2, 2016 
 
PROJECT AIM: To investigate the underlying causes and site specific conditions 
contributing to the regular derailments at CD3 and CD4. 
Develop a rectification methodology, including the development of a 
replacement fit for purpose checkrail. 
Identify and deliver maintenance recommendations for the new 
checkrail  
 
PROGRAMME: (VERSION1, 14/03/2016) 
1. Research previous failures on network relating to track geometry and check rail position 
2. Conduct site investigation and measurement of existing track geometry 
3. Review incident reports from historical derailments 
4. Review of historical “as constructed” drawings 
5. Conduct assessment of wheel position 
6. Assessment of existing checkrail effectiveness 
7. Design of new customised checkrail 
8. Complete cost evaluation of proposed design installation 
9. Develop maintenance plan and methodology  
 
*If time permits produce scope of work to install checkrail to CD3 and CD4 
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Appendix B -  Historical Derailments 
Date	 Location Position Car Number Tag Assumed Cause Incident Number 
29/6/2016 CD4P 225 B25045 45 Track Design/Maintenance 1000438148 
28/6/2016 CD4P 217 B25270 44 Track Design/Maintenance 1000437301 
12/03/2016 CD4P 221 B25019 47 Track Design/Maintenance   
5/03/2016 CD4P 217 HI7210 24 Track Design/Maintenance 1000428150 
20/02/2016 CD3P 223 C15759 15 Track Design/Maintenance 
1000426863/ 
1000426866 
17/01/2016 CD3P 209 B25040 37 Track Design/Maintenance 1000423810 
6/07/2015 CD3P 225 B25186 46 Track Design/Maintenance 1000332788 
4/03/2015 CD4P 226 B25470 37 Track design/Maintenance 1000328593 
3/04/2015 CD3P         1000325266 
21/07/2014 CD3P 
217 and 
223 
HI8390 and 
HI8395   Track design/Maintenance 1000286258 
28/05/2014 CD3P 232 HI7504   driver notched up too fast   
21/04/2014 CD4P    N/A   CD4P fault/error -> check   
9/12/2013 CD3P 175 HI7280   Track Design/Maintenance 1000255885 
1/05/2012 CD4P N/A     
New Q series slipped out of 
dumper   
6/03/2012 CD3P 
not 
available     Track Design/Maintenance   
30/11/2012 CD4P 
not 
available     CD4P tail track 280 points 1000175261 
3/06/2012 CD3P 206 8747 34 6 cars from CD3P 1000136376 
17/02/2012 CD3P 
not 
available 6887   Track design/maintenance 1000117510 
12/06/2010 CD3P 
not 
available 6613/1599   CD3P derailed no detail 1000071538 
18/03/2010 CD4P 
not 
available     
derailment of empty ore cars 
no detail 1000065144 
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Appendix C -  Risk Assessment 
L2RA - 50mm billet to front of check rail.xlsx
Version 1.0
Uncontrolled when printed
See document mangement system for current document
Page 1 of 1
Copyright Statement
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HSEQ Qualitative Risk Analysis (Level 2) - Workshop Record Sheet
To record Predicted Risk unhide columns AF-AH
Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Optional Optional Optional Optional Optional O Mandatory Mandatory Optional Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Optional Optional Optional Optional
Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Free Text Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Free Text Rio Tinto Defined Free Text Rio Tinto Defined Free Text Free Text Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Rio Tinto Defined Free Text Free Text Business Defined Free Text
RISK HEADER RISK SCENARIO INHERENT RISK - Optional Data Capture CURRENT RISK - mandatory data capture IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS - proposed new controls
Risk ID Hazard Type Hazard Description 
(Sub-Type)
Operational Status Scenario Description Consequence 
Category
Consequence 
Sub-Category
Consequence Likelihood Risk Rating Risk Comments Cause Description C
a
u
s
e 
C
o
m
m
e
n
t
s
Control Type 
Description
Control Comments Impact Description Consequence Likelihood Risk Rating Risk Comments Action Description Action Owner Position Action Status / Comments
P01 Mechanical Mass and Stability Normal Operation EXISTING MAINTAINED RISK PROFILE
Existing track section in specification with correct geometry, alignment and existing check rail in 
place. Wagons derail and cause dumper shut and inability to offload wagons
Production volumes Quantity / output 2-Medium D-Unlikely Low Risk consequence and likelyhood 
taken from information pre 
installation of existing checkrail. 
Equipment difficulty 4 Administrative 
Controls
Existing track system:
Regular maintenance
Correct alignment
Within geometry specification.
Limited gauge face wear
Ballast bonding
Existing section was derailment free for 18 
months following the completion of a rerail and 
realignment.
2-Medium D-Unlikely Low Risk rating consequence has been assumed to impact 
train losses for 1 day on both outgoing lines  
 
P02 3 Engineering 
Controls
Install checkrail with existing 100mm gap
Is currently installed and proving to provide minor control and 
risk reduction
Checkrail does not adequately control derailment 
likelyhood due to flange climb and flange position 
on high leg of curve. See report 'CD3P and 
CD4P Check Rail Modification' date:13 August 
2014
Likelyhood of derailment does not significantly 
decrease.
2-Medium B-Likely High  
P03 3 Engineering 
Controls
Install checkrail with proposed 60mm gap Mild Steel Checkrail may not adequately control derailment 
likelyhood due to flange climb and flange position 
on high leg of curve. New installation has 
possibility of  loco wheelset binding, excessive 
high leg gauge face wear, therefore increaseing 
track gauge resulting in excessive checkrail 
wear.
Likelyhood of derailment does not significantly 
decrease. Calcualtions using Nadal equation 
suggest improvement in the order of 20%
2-Medium B-Likely High Interem solution of closing the gap may not realise the risk 
reduction initially estimated. An improvement of 20% does 
not necessarily translate to a reduction in the likelihood of 
derailment.
 
P04 3 Engineering 
Controls
Install custom designed active checkrail
*Checkrail designed to suit location and variability in wheel 
configuration
*L/V ratio optimised for location
Custom checkrail adequately spaced and 
optimised for the location could offer theroretical 
improvement of 100% based on a doubling of 
weight in the Nadal equation. 
Failure to remove track dip reduces 
effectiveness. Solution assumes hostorical track 
maintenance and possible return of dip.
2-Medium C-Possible Moderate Installation of custom checkrail will reduce likelihood. 
Inclusion of DED's should be considered as part of the 
overall solution to reduce the impact and therefore 
maximum reasonable consequence of flange climb 
derailment. 
 
P05 3 Engineering 
Controls
Install custom active checkrail and transition track stiffness 
of the section to end of concrete slab.
Installation of custom checkrail and transition 
section will provide a system to ensure better 
track geometry and also provide an additional 
control for flange climb. Likelyhood is evidenced 
by 18 month gap in derailments from 2010 when 
the section was realigned and re-railed. 
Transition section assumes the dip will be 
eliminated.
2-Medium D-Unlikely Low  
P06 3 Engineering 
Controls
Peer check engineering design
Check gap width by calculation and simulation to ensure gap is 
wide enough.  Calculation to allow for center axle floats. 
Installation to ensure geometry check and post installation 
observation.
Locomotive Derailment, check rail damage 1-Minor C-Possible Low Locomotive derailment may not cause closure of dumper 
line, however is assumed to cause damage to the rail and 
therfore envoke a minor consequence, due to shorter 
down time and lower value losses.
 
P07 4 Administrative 
Controls
Post installation monitoring and preventative maintenance 
On site checks and maintenance to ensure checkrail remains 
within tolerances
Derailment, check rail damage 2-Medium D-Unlikely Low Maintenance tactics have historically been unable to 
maintain required parameters for existing configuration. 
Due to the nature of the issue, adequate maintenance is 
seen as the largest contributiong factor to derailment 
reduction.
 
P08
P09
P10 3 Engineering 
Controls
Increase checkrail stiffness by adding brackets
Billet makes it stiffer, wheel must already have started riding up 
the high leg. Geometry checks so it is not always contacting 
hard against the check rail
Derailment, check rail damage 1-Minor C-Possible Low Likely to occur with Locomotive impact due to weight and 
deflection, therefore reducing the consequence impact.
 
P11 3 Engineering 
Controls
Ensure design adequately considers worn wheel/Rail 
impact
geometry check with worn rail, wheels and tightest back to back
Derailment, check rail damage 2-Medium C-Possible Moderate Due to variability in tolerances with wheel and rail wear, 
caluculation of optimal gap with temporary checkrail 
design will still see the liklihood as possible.
 
P12 Rio Tinto or Business Unit 
Reputation
Negative 1-Minor B-Likely Moderate In the current situation without 
changes to the underlying issues 
including maintenance tactics and 
induced in train forces, the likelyhood 
of derailment is not significantly 
reduced.
Management system 4 Administrative 
Controls
Do not install temporary solution
Historical work combined with engineering design, likely 
outcome assessment and risk impact assessment indicate that 
the only feasible checkrail solution should be a custom 
designed solution. The installation of a temporary measure is 
likely to be seen as a failure by stakeholders.  Higher initial cost 
is the main impact of choosing a custom solution.
Loss of future opportunity to provide engineering 
support amonst stakeholders within RTIO. 
Possible negative ONSR implications. Loss of 
credibility and professional standing
1-Minor B-Likely Moderate Due to stakeholder expectation and understanding of 
checkrail, temporary makeshift repair may be seen as 
solution to derailment problem. If a subsequent derailment 
occurs, despite not being the optimal checkrail solution 
the stakeholdr expectation will n and cause reputational 
damage to the Dept
Custom checkrail solution to be 
further investigated by Rail 
Engineering. Solution to investigate 
Cost V Benefit analysis in addition to 
business risk.
Risk Assessment of the solution will 
be captured as part derailment 
investigation already being 
undertaken.
Principal – Mechanical & 
Network Infrastructure
P13 Compliance impact License - external 
(potential)
1-Minor D-Unlikely Low It is unlikely that a compliance impact 
will be realised unless a number of 
hazards align and due process has 
not been followed.
Management system 4 Administrative 
Controls
Compliance with engineering design principals and change 
management process 
Maintaining existing standards and following approved process 
will ensure compliance.
Loss of license to operate amonst stakeholders 
within RTIO. Possible negative ONSR 
implications
1-Minor D-Unlikely Low It is unlikely that a compliance impact will be realised 
unless a number of hazards align and due process has 
not been followed.
 
3 Engineering 
Controls
Alter Checkrail profile
Chamfer mild steel billets in attempt to reduce likelihood of 
flange climb
Derailment, check rail damage 2-Medium C-Possible Moderate Champher of edge on mid steel rail will not be as effective 
as custom checkrail and will not guarantee reudction in 
climb
 
Whilst Each of these individual 
controls may reduce the likelihood 
when considered in isolation, the 
probability that at least one of these 
will happen is still Likely and the 
consequence is the same as the 
inherent risk being medium. With this 
considered the risk reduction by 
installing a temporary solution at this 
location and reducing the gap to 
60mm will not be realised.
Equipment difficulty-
Design
Rail Engineering suffers reputational damage due to solutions failing to appreciably change 
derailment frequency.Social / Cultural
Stakeholder 
Expectations
Quantity / output 2-Medium B-Likely High
Inherant risk is taken from line 
P03. Individually each hazard 
likelihood will rate lower than the 
overall liklihood. Likelihood of at 
least 1 event occuring increases 
the overall occurrence likelihood 
and will increase the risk rating.
Mechanical Mass and Stability Normal Operation
INSTALLATION OF A CHECKRAIL WITH 60mm GAP 
Installation causes any of the listed issues, resulting in derailment and dumper closure
- Locomotives long wheel base to have excessive rolling resistance against the check rail.
- A single wheel is captured between the check rail and low leg can cause wheel chatter and 
wheel climb 
- Wheels bite into mild steel check rail assisting a flange climb 
- Wear rate of mild steel reduces check rail effectiveness
- Bracket spacing is 2365mm which could potentially allow the check rail to deflect allowing the 
wheels to ride over it
- Narrow back to back and worn rail/wheel causing the check rail to be constantly contacted.
Production volumes
Mechanical Mass and Stability Normal Operation
Inherent risk does not consider 
inclusion of checkrail. Risk 
consequence and likelyhood taken 
from information pre installation of 
existing checkrail and rerail of 
section in 2010. Information 
presented for the CEA justification of 
the checkrail installation estimated 
the lost tonnes of 450,000T p.a. 
2-Medium B-Likely High
CURRENT RISK PROFILE
Existing track section allowed to develop geometry misalignment before crossing, causing intrain 
forces and wheel flange climb to derail wagons resulting in dual line dumper closure.
Production volumes Quantity / output
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Appendix D -  Rail Profile  
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Appendix E -  Checkrail Design 
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Appendix F -  Maintenance Track Geometry Limits 
Within the current track configuration, it is Rio Tinto Iron Ore Railways Division requirement to: 
• Attempt to achieve at least the value of those figures listed in Table 7 under 
“Target Level” for the respective parameters described and for the respective 
Classes of track. 
• As soon as practicable, carry out corrections to the track where the measured 
value of a particular parameter exceeds a value of the order of those listed under 
“Tolerance Level” in Table 7 for the respective parameters described and for the 
respective Classes of track. 
• Take immediate precautionary and corrective action to the track where the 
measured value of a particular parameter exceeds a value listed under “Critical 
Level” in Table 7 for the respective parameters described and for the respective 
Classes of track 
The measurement of track geometry is intended to be carried out with a TRV for Class A tracks 
and for Class B & C track the measurements shall be made manually / by measuring trolley in 
accordance with the standards set out in Table 7. 
Table 7 – Track Geometry Limits 
Parameter Class of Track Target (mm) Defect (mm) Critical (mm) 
Twist 
2m/8m chords  
 
A 
B 
C 
3 
4 
6 
8 
14 
16 
12 
18 
18 
Top  
5.983m chord 
 
A 
B 
C 
5 
7 
10 
7 
14 
16 
12 
20 
20 
Top  
10m chord 
 
A 
B 
C 
9 
12 
18 
12 
24 
28 
21 
35 
35 
Line 7.925m 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
4 
6 
12 
10 
20 
23 
16 
26 
26 
Line 10m: A 
B 
C 
6  
9  
18 
13 
26 
30 
21 
35 
35 
Min Gauge: 
 
A 
B 
C 
1433  (-2) 
1433  (-2) 
1430  (-5) 
1430  (-5) 
1425  (-10) 
1423  (-12) 
1428  (-7) 
1421  (-14) 
1421  (-14) 
Max Gauge: A 
B 
C 
1443  (+8) 
1450  (+15) 
1455  (+20) 
1445  (+10) 
1455  (+20) 
1457  (+22) 
1453  (+18) 
1460  (+25) 
1460  (+25) 
 7 
Crosslevel 
(Deviation from 
Applied 
Superelevation) 
N/A 5 10 20 
 
Twist Defect 
The difference between the cross levels over a defined length (i.e. the difference in 
level of the two rails). 
‘Short’ and ‘long’ twist are specified to ensure that rolling stock can negotiate a twist 
without wheel unloading. 
• Short twist, measured over 2m or a similar length is representative of the axle 
spacing for freight and passenger bogies for most railway operations. 
• ‘Long’ twist, measured over 8m or a similar length is representative of the 
minimum rolling stock length for most railway operations. Ore cars used by Rio 
Tinto are significantly shorter than most other bogie rolling stock, including other 
heavy haul railways, and therefore a long twist length of 8m is used on the Rio 
Tinto Network. 
The high load to tare ratio of the ore cars also impacts on the ability of the designers 
to optimise the suspension characteristics to cope with track twist. 
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Appendix G -  Derailment Information 
 
1.1.1.1.1 FleetOne information for B20270 
Flange Climb 
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A.1 Vehicle Mimic B20045 
 
1.1.1.1.2 FleetOne information for B20045 
  
Flange Climb 
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A.2 WID System 
 
1.1.1.1.3 B20270 derailed wheel set WID impact trend 
 
 
1.1.1.1.4 B20270 WID wagon weights 
 
1.1.1.1.5 B20045 derailed wheel set WID impact trend 
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1.1.1.1.6 B20045 WID wagon weights 
A.3 HBD System 
 
1.1.1.1.7 B20270 Hot Box temperature trend – R1 
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1.1.1.1.8 B20270 Hot Box temperature trend – L1 
 
1.1.1.1.9 B20045 Hot Box temperature trend – R1 
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1.1.1.1.10 B20045 Hot Box temperature trend – L1 
A.4 RailBAM System 
 
1.1.1.1.11 B20270 RailBAM Trend R1 
 
1.1.1.1.12 B20270 RailBAM Trend L1 
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1.1.1.1.13 B20045 RailBAM Trend R1 
 
1.1.1.1.14 B20045 RailBAM Trend L1 
 
A.5 OCCM System 
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1.1.1.1.15 B20270 Axle 1 OCCM reading 
 
1.1.1.1.16 B20045 Axle 1 OCCM reading 
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A.6 Track Map 
 
1.1.1.1.17 Parker Point Yard track schematic 
A.7 Track Maintenance History 
The following track maintenance data has been gathered from the following SAP 
function locations: 
- Parker Point Yard (3076PPYDML) 
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- Parker Point Yard Track (3076PPYDMLTRAC) 
- Road 5 Sw340 to End CD4 LCL & Tail (3076PPYDMLROAD .RD05) 
Notification	 Completion	Date	 Description	
25796033 02/08/2016 CD4P LCL -0.050km Replace IRJ E/W Rails 
29550412 19/07/2016 CD4P ECL Re-rail W/R week 27 Priority 
26570823 19/07/2016 CD4P 16W Loaded Car Line Clean Track 
29263656 21/06/2016 PPYARD CD4 fouled ballast Remove 
28663719 01/06/2016 ^PPCD4LCL-1.523  W   DW UT Defect 
28888315 30/05/2016 CD4 outgo remove fouled ballast 
28011534 13/05/2016 CD4 outgo remove fouled ballast 
28640982 23/04/2016 Callout CD4 Inspect after derailment 
25908379 27/03/2016 CD4P Derailment Remediation works 
22943243 14/12/2015 # Repair track geometry issues CD4P 
26238354 23/10/2015 PPCD4LCL -0.525 U/T DEFECT VSW 
IMMEDIATE 
23630402 04/05/2015 ^S&L outgo end of CD4P 
21069979 09/12/2014 ^Re-rail CD4PLCL -0.5 to -1.1 WR 
21103501 04/06/2014 Vac Truck Tail Track CD4P every shut 
21622800 20/05/2014 Trim Dumper Rails Ingo end CD4P 
18982780 13/04/2014 Replace WR 1.39-1.72 km CD4LCL PP 
21153895 31/03/2014 Remove DED from Ingo end CD4P 
21069969 24/03/2014 Replace IRJ W/Rail CD4P Outgo end 
20181262 13/11/2013 S&L CD4P Rerailer 
20575926 23/10/2013 Profile Grind 361A & 361B 
18982755 20/09/2013 Replace ER 1.39-1.72 km CD4LCL PP 
19340587 03/09/2013 Install re-railers for engineering 
18919423 24/04/2013 Ultrasonic Defect  PPMLWTP W 1.260 DWH 
17011529 24/04/2013 Rail Profile Monitoring Program MLE/ WTP 
18937013 14/04/2013 Replace WR 2.3 to 3.65 km PPYD 
16935448 20/02/2012 Weekly Switch Inspections PP YARD 
16802451 16/02/2012 CD4P Dumper Rail Inspection 
16832141 13/02/2012 DPR Weld out rail joints 362 switch 
 
